TY - JOUR
T1 - SUSTAINABLE AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY CHAIN IN THE PRESENCE OF DISRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
AU - Zaefarian, Tahereh
AU - Ghandehari, Mahsa
AU - Modarres, Mohammad
AU - Khalilzadeh, Mohammad
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The authors. Published by EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI 2024.
PY - 2024/5/1
Y1 - 2024/5/1
N2 - This paper aims to develop and simulate a green automotive supply chain model (ASC) consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and two types of products (green and non-green) under disruption risks (DRs). The greening effort (i.e., electric vehicle production) is considered for both the supplier and the manufacturer. In our modeling, we include the local government intervention (GI) and their incentivization of manufacturers to produce greener products. Moreover, the effectiveness of centralized versus decentralized supply chain integration strategies in coping with disruption consequences was explored. A mathematical pricing model based on game theory is designed to maximize the total profit for both integrated and decentralized systems. The model examines the effects of the greening effort on the supply chain (SC) members with eight disruption scenarios, including Extra Production and Surplus Inventory. Simulating numerical examples reveals that the Extra Production type of disruption increase the profitability in different scenarios. Conversely, the Surplus Inventory disruption reduces profitability. Moreover, a channel coordination through cost sharing contract in the presence of disruption sharing was developed. GI and the cost-sharing contract increase the SC profit. The managerial implications of our findings are also discussed in this paper.
AB - This paper aims to develop and simulate a green automotive supply chain model (ASC) consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and two types of products (green and non-green) under disruption risks (DRs). The greening effort (i.e., electric vehicle production) is considered for both the supplier and the manufacturer. In our modeling, we include the local government intervention (GI) and their incentivization of manufacturers to produce greener products. Moreover, the effectiveness of centralized versus decentralized supply chain integration strategies in coping with disruption consequences was explored. A mathematical pricing model based on game theory is designed to maximize the total profit for both integrated and decentralized systems. The model examines the effects of the greening effort on the supply chain (SC) members with eight disruption scenarios, including Extra Production and Surplus Inventory. Simulating numerical examples reveals that the Extra Production type of disruption increase the profitability in different scenarios. Conversely, the Surplus Inventory disruption reduces profitability. Moreover, a channel coordination through cost sharing contract in the presence of disruption sharing was developed. GI and the cost-sharing contract increase the SC profit. The managerial implications of our findings are also discussed in this paper.
KW - Automotive supply chain
KW - cost sharing contract
KW - disruption
KW - game theory
KW - government intervention
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85197517491&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1051/ro/2023108
DO - 10.1051/ro/2023108
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85197517491
SN - 2804-7303
VL - 58
SP - 2445
EP - 2479
JO - RAIRO - Operations Research
JF - RAIRO - Operations Research
IS - 3
ER -