Resumen
This work aims to delve deeper into the concept of freedom as self-determination of the will in Juan Duns Escoto. The problem of choice is interpreted from a reading of Aristotelian ethics that favors a point of view focused on the fact that what properly directs choice, understood as rational desire, is reason itself. However, the problem arises of to what extent, then, it would really be a free choice, since, when the object of desire is shown to the intellect, it could not deny it if it is rational, so the choice would be determined by one's own desire. rational nature. Not being able to go against one's own rationality, furthermore, would not be limitation but coherence. For Scotus, rather, freedom is primarily constituted by the possibility of choosing any of the opposites, and even though now of choice the will always maintains the possibility of choice. Thus, freedom is understood as self-determination of the will.
Título traducido de la contribución | THE FREE WILL IN DUNS SCOTO The possibility of choice |
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Idioma original | Español |
Páginas (desde-hasta) | 82-91 |
Número de páginas | 10 |
Publicación | Prometeica |
Volumen | 30 |
DOI | |
Estado | Publicada - 1 jul. 2024 |
Publicado de forma externa | Sí |
Palabras clave
- choice
- freedom
- reason
- self-determination
- will