Criminal governance and extortion in informal economies: fear as a mechanism of territorial control in Lima

Introduction: This article examines extortion as a form of criminal governance embedded in contexts of high economic informality, focusing on the case of San Juan de Lurigancho, Lima. The study conceptualizes extortion not merely as a criminal act, but as a socioeconomic mechanism that regulates territory, economic activity, and everyday life in the absence of effective state protection. Methods: Drawing on a phenomenological qualitative research design, the study involved 20 in-depth interviews with economic agents with constrained agency, community leaders, and judicial actors to explore the dynamics of extortion and its impact on social and economic regulation. Results: The findings show that extortion operates as a system of informal taxation sustained through the strategic production and normalization of affective regimes of fear, which function as a technology of social control. This regime is increasingly mediated by digital platforms, enabling the viralization of threats and a digitalization of coercion. Consequently, violence becomes routinized, social trust erodes, and silence is institutionalized as a survival strategy. Economic agents deploy adaptive responses ranging from pragmatic negotiation to fragile forms of collective organization. Discussion: The article expands the literature on criminal governance by demonstrating how economic informality, selective state presence, and digitally mediated coercion converge to produce a hybrid system of regulation. This study contributes to broader debates on informality, violence, and governance in urban contexts of the Global South.