Sobre el conocimiento de la cosa en sí según Schopenhauer On the knowledge of the thing-in-itself according to Schopenhauer

This paper proposes to analyze Schopenhauer’s methodological and hermeneutical considerations regarding the knowledge of the thing-in-itself. For this purpose, I explain the nature of the philosophical abstraction in light of the primacy of the metaphysics of the Will. I argue that the possibility of the philosophical research is rooted on the interpretation of self-knowledge as an instance of the Will’s objectivation. In this regard, I will plead that the definition and criteria developed by Schopenhauer for his philosophy are established at the expense of deductive demonstration, in favor of a peculiar and particular form of abstraction fitted for the philosophical enterprise and subject matter. Finally, I will present an interpretation of the epistemological basis of reflection in line with schopenhauerian philosophy.